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ON CYBER ATTACKS AND SIGNATURE BASED INTRUSION
DETECTION FOR MODBUS BASED INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEMS
Wei Gao
Thomas H. Morris
morris@ece.msstate.edu
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Mississippi State University
ABSTRACT
Industrial control system communication networks are vulnerable to reconnaissance, response injection,
command injection, and denial of service attacks. Such attacks can lead to an inability to monitor and control
industrial control systems and can ultimately lead to system failure. This can result in financial loss for control
system operators and economic and safety issues for the citizens who use these services. This paper describes
a set of 28 cyber attacks against industrial control systems which use the MODBUS application layer network
protocol. The paper also describes a set of standalone and state based intrusion detection system rules which
can be used to detect cyber attacks and to store evidence of attacks for post incident analysis. All attacks
described in this paper were validated in a laboratory environment. The detection rate of the intrusion
detection system rules presented by attack class is also presented.
Keywords: cyber security, intrusion detection system, industrial control system, cyber physical system
industrial control system. Stuxnet targeted
computers running the Siemens WinCC SCADA
software product. Infected systems had a dynamic
link library (DLL) used by the WinCC Step7 tool
replaced with a malicious DLL. The worm then
monitored communications between the WinCC tool
and a remote terminal. If a specific signature related
to the remote terminal was found, firmware on the
remote terminal was replaced with malicious code.
In a third incident in January 2000, a disgruntled
engineer attacked the Maroochy Shire Council’s
sewage control system in Queensland, Australia. A
pump in the control system failed to start or stop
when specified and alarms failed to alert. This attack
caused approximately 264,000 gallons of raw
sewage to leak to into nearby rivers (Slay & Miller,
2007). Finally, in 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear
plant in Oak Harbor Ohio was attacked by the
Slammer Worm which caused a safety monitoring
system of the plant go offline for approximately five
hours (Poulsen, 2009).

1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems, also called Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control
systems, and process control systems, have a
strategic importance due to the fact that they are
adopted by the critical infrastructure of
industrialized nations. There have been several realworld documented incidents and cyber attacks
affecting industrial control systems, which clearly
illustrate critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.
Team Cymru, a specialized Internet security
research firm, released a briefing paper (Santorelli,
2009) which discussed malicious port scan activity
against their DarkNet (a honey pot) searching for
open ports on port numbers commonly associated
with SCADA system network protocols. This report
showed heavy scanning activity from four areas:
Asia, North America, Western Europe and Eastern
Europe. The report cited heavy scanning of DNP3
ports from Russia and Taiwan and heavy scanning
activities for MODBUS related ports in Western
Europe and China. This port scanning is potentially
indicative of attackers searching for SCADA
systems for later attacks. Stuxnet (Falliere, O’Murchu,
& Chien, 2011) is the first known worm to target an

Forensic systems to detect and store evidence of a
cyber attacks against SCADA control systems are
not common. Cyber attacks against SCADA control
systems may occur at nodes typically found in
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enterprise systems such as personal computers,
network switches, servers, or firewalls. Cyber
attacks may also be directed at devices specific to
SCADA control systems such as programmable
logic controllers (PLC), programmable automation
controllers (PAC), remote terminal units (RTU),
master terminal units (MTU), and intelligent
electronic devices (IED). This paper addresses a
forensic solution to detect attacks against MODBUS
clients and servers.

Govindarasu, 2011). The Siemens Simatic S7 PLC
has been the subject of extensive review for cyber
vulnerabilities. Reconnaissance, fingerprint, replay,
authentication bypass, and remote attacks against the
Siemens Simatic S7 PLC are presented in
(Beresford, 2011). A taxonomy of energy control
system vulnerabilities lists probe, flood, bypass,
terminate, execute, modify and deletion attacks
(Fleury, Khurana, & Welch, 2009). Bulk power
transmission systems use state estimation algorithms
to plan for power system contingencies. Altered
current and voltage measurements in power systems
can lead to financial loss and misoperation of the
power system (Liu, Reiter, Ning, 2009; Xie, Mo,
Sinopoli, 2010).

This paper has 2 primary contributions. First,
MODBUS is a network communication protocol
commonly used in industrial control systems
throughout many industries. This paper presents a
set of 28 attacks against MODBUS control systems.
Attacks are grouped into 4 categories;
reconnaissance, response injection, command
injection, and denial of service. Each attack is
described in detail. All of the attacks presented in
this paper were implemented and validated in a
laboratory environment against 2 control systems
built with commercial hardware and software; a gas
pipeline system and a storage tank. Second, this
paper presents a state based signature intrusion
detection system designed to detect and alert for
each of the 28 cyber attacks. All rules were tested in
a laboratory setting and this paper provides detection
accuracy results. The intrusion detection system and
rules described in this paper can be used to detect
attacks real time.

Digital forensics capabilities for industrial control
systems are limited (Nance, Hay, & Bishop, 2009).
Most process control systems store significant
information about process measurements and
process control decisions. Industrial control systems
lack forensic tools to capture and store network
traffic which may provide evidence of a malicious
intrusion. Research is needed to determine the types
of information which should be collected and to
determine where to place devices to collect
information (Valli, 2009). A forensic architecture
which identifies locations to collect forensic
information for industrial control systems has been
proposed (Chandia, Gonzalez, Kilpatrick, Papa, &
Shenoi, 2007). The use of the Snort IDS to capture
forensic evidence from industrial control system
which use the MODBUS network protocol has been
proposed in (Slay & Sitnikova, 2009). A data logger
to capture and store MODBUS/RTU and
MODBUS/ASCII network traffic was proposed in
(Morris & Pavurapu, 2010). A retrofit intrusion
detection system is described in (Morris, Vaughn,
Dandass, 2012). This system was used to
demonstrate that 11 of 14 open source Snort rules
written for the MODBUS/TCP protocol are also
applicable
to
the
MODBUS/RTU
and
MODBUS/ASCII protocols. This work was
extended to include 50 Snort rules to detect protocol
mutation attacks against MODBUS servers (Morris,
Vaughn, & Dandass, 2013).

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First,
a section on related works is provided. Next, the 28
cyber attacks are presented. Next, the signature
based intrusion detection system is discussed.
Finally, conclusions and future work are offered.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Many attacks against industrial control systems have
been described in literature. These attacks highlight
the threat to industrial control systems and
emphasize the need for tools to capture network
traffic related to cyber security attacks. A stealthy
attack was developed which steals water from an
irrigation canal which used SCADA equipment to
track water usage (Amin, Litrico, Sastry, & Bayen,
2013). Multiple cyber attack scenarios including
malicious command injection and man-in-themiddle attacks to change process measurements
from a wind turbine are presented in (Yan, Liu, &

The MODBUS protocol (MODBUS-IDA, 2006) is
widely used for industrial control systems. This
acceptance in industry is partially related to the
simplicity of the protocol. MODBUS collectively
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refers to MODBUS over
MODBUS/TCP protocols.

Serial

Line

and

packets, while ASCII mode uses reserved ASCII
characters to delimit the start and end of frames.
RTU mode appends a cyclic redundancy code
(CRC) to the end of each frame. ASCII mode
packets end with a linear redundancy code (LRC).
The MODBUS protocol data unit (PDU) includes a
function code and payload. The function code
specifies the type of transaction. Payload contents
are specific to the function code.

MODBUS over Serial Line traffic includes two
modes; RTU and ASCII. RTU mode packets are
binary and transmit a single bit for each bit in an
application data unit (ADU). ASCII mode packets
convert each byte transmitted to a single ASCII
character. Frame delimiters differ for each mode.
RTU mode uses dead space on the line to delimit
MODBUS PROTOCOL DATA UNIT (PDU)
FC

PAYLOAD

MODBUS OVER SERIAL LINE APPLICATION DATA UNIT (ADU)
ADDR

PDU

CRC/LRC

MODBUS/TCP APPLICATION DATA UNIT (ADU)
MBAP
PDU
HEADER
MODBUS Application Protocol (MBAP) HEADER
TRANSACTION PROTOCOL
UNIT
LENGTH
IDENTIFIER
IDENTIFIER
IDENTIFIER
Figure 1 MODBUS Protocol Data Unit (PDU) and Application Data Units (ADU)

MODBUS/TCP is a transmission control protocol
(TCP) based protocol intended for use on routable
user datagram protocol (UDP) or internet protocol
(IP) networks. The PDU for MODBUS/TCP is the
same as the PDU for MODBUS over Serial Line.
The MODBUS/TCP PDU is prepended with a
MODBUS application protocol (MBAP) header
which includes a transaction identifier, protocol
identifier, length, and unit identifier. The transaction
identifier is a unique value for each query and
response pair. This is usually a counter. The protocol
identifier specifies the protocol version and is
always 0. The length parameter specifies the length
in bytes of the rest of the packet. The unit identifier
is a unique value corresponding to the target slave.
The unit identifier is analogous to the MODBUS
over serial line address. MODBUS/TCP does not
include a CRC. Rather, transmission error detection
is provided by the TCP packet. Figure 1 shows the
MODBUS PDU, MODBUS ADU for MODBUS

over Serial Line and MODBUS TCP, and the
MODBUS MBAP header.
The MODBUS protocol is very simple. Generally
MODBUS packets come in pairs. A master node
sends a query and a slave node sends a response.
This query/response paradigm is the most common
form of communication. Broadcast packets are
allowed in which case there is no response.
Neither MODBUS over Serial Line or
MODBUS/TCP include features to prevent replay
attacks or to provide a method to authenticate the
sender. MODBUS vulnerabilities have been well
discussed in literature. The MODBUS/TCP protocol
has been the subject of multiple vulnerability
studies. MODBUS/TCP systems are vulnerable to
denial of service attacks from compromised human
machine interface hosts and man-in-the-middle
attacks due to a lack of a digital signature to sign
network frames (Mallouhi, Al-Nashif, Cox,
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Chadaga, & Hariri, 2011). The lack of digital
signature or other means to ensure the integrity of
network frames in industrial control systems leads to
many vulnerabilities. Altered process measurements
can lead operators to take incorrect control actions
based on malicious fake data and injected commands
can cause systems to take unwanted control actions
(Huang, et al., 2009; Sridhar, & Manimaran, 2010).
A separate comprehensive attack taxonomy with
some overlap with this paper is available in
(Huitsing, Chandia, Papa, & Shenoi, 2008). In
summary, cyber penetration of control systems
monitoring and controlling MODBUS based
industrial control systems can lead to loss of the
visibility and control.Industrial control systems
implement feedback control loops to monitor and
control the systems. Figure 2 shows a typical
industrial control system configuration with three
feedback control loops. The first feedback control
loop connects a programmable logic controller
(PLC) to sensors and actuators which in turn connect
to the physical process. This feedback control loop

does not use network protocols. The connections are
made using analog and digital inputs and outputs on
the PLC. The PLC implements a program to perform
distributed control actions. For safety reasons the
PLC can typically control the physical process
without a network connection to the human machine
interface (HMI) or master terminal unit (MTU) or
other upstream components. The second feedback
control loop is from the PLC to the HMI or MTU.
The HMI/MTU are typically connected to the PLC
with a network which may be implemented via many
physical layers (Ethernet, Serial, wireless, etc.) and
many transport, network, and application layer
protocols (TCP/IP, RS-232, Zigbee, MODBUS,
DNP3, etc.). The HMI/MTU continually queries the
PLC for sensor measurements. The HMI/MTU may
implement a system level control algorithm. The last
feedback control loop is the presentation of process
information to a human operator. The human in
presented with system state information and the
human provides supervisory control such as process
limits, system state, system control scheme.

Human in the
loop
MODBUS Query/Command
control

HMI/MTU

wide area control loop

PLC

measurement
MODBUS Response

control

Physical
Process

local
control
loop

network

measurement

Sensor

Figure 2 Typical Industrial Control System Feedback Control Loops

3. ATTACKS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
The set of attacks described in this paper are grouped into four categories; reconnaissance, response injection,
command injection, and denial of service. Reconnaissance attacks gather control system network information,
map the network architecture, and identify the device characteristics such as manufacturer, model number,
supported network protocols, system address, and system memory map. Response injection attacks attempt
to present invalid sensor information, process measurements and process state to the controller of a feedback
control loop. Command injection attacks attempt to inject invalid commands which cause incorrect control
actions. Denial of service attacks attempt to disrupt or break the communication links which implement the
feedback control loops. This paper is limited to attacks to the link between the HMI/MTU and the PLC. For
the work in this paper this link was implemented with the MODBUS application layer protocol.
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Signature based Snort intrusion detection rules were written to detect the attacks described in this section.
Table 1 and Table 2 provide a cross reference for attacks versus associated IDS rule for each attack. The
remainder of this section describes the attacks listed in Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1 Reconnaissance and Response Injection Attacks versus IDS Rule Cross Reference

Name

Associated Intrusion Detection Rule

Address Scan

3.1 RTU/ASCII INVALID ADDRESS
3.2 TCP INVALID ADDRESS

Function Code Scan

3.3 FUNCTION CODE SCAN

Device Identification

3.4 DEVICE ID SCAN

Points Scan

3.5 WRITE POINTS SCAN
3.6 READ POINTS SCAN
3.7 INVALID ADDRESS

Memory Dump

3.6 READ POINTS SCAN

Naïve Read Payload Injection

3.16 INVALID RESPONSE PAYLOAD CONTENT

Invalid Read Payload Size

3.16 INVALID RESPONSE PAYLOAD CONTENT

Naïve False Error Response

3.18 INVALID ERROR RESPONSE

Negative Sensor Measurement(s)

4.1 Pipeline Negative Pressure Response
4.2 STORAGE TANK FILL LEVEL NEGATIVE RESPONSE

Sensor Measurement Grossly Out of
Bounds

4.3 Pipeline Measurement Out-of-bounds
4.4 STORAGE TANK MEASUREMENT OUT-OF-BOUNDS

Sporadic Sensor Measurement Injection

4.5 PIPELINE MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF CHANGE
4.6 STORAGE TANK MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF
CHANGE

Random Sensor Measurement Injection

4.5 PIPELINE MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF CHANGE
4.6 STORAGE TANK MEASUREMENT MAX RATE OF
CHANGE

Constant Sensor Measurement Injection

4.9 PIPELINE CONSTANT MEASUREMENT

High Slope Measurement Injection

4.5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of Change
4.6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate of Change

Low Slope Measurement Injection

4.7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of Change
4.8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate of Change

Calculated Measurement Injection

4.5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of Change
4.6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate of Change
4.7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of Change
4.8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate of Change

Replayed Measurement Injection

4.5 Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of Change
4.6 Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate of Change
4.7 Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of Change
4.8 Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate of Change
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Likely threat actors for the attacks described in this
section are either insiders with access to the network
attached to the master or slave or malware which
penetrates the network and installs malicious code
on a machine on the vulnerable network. For
MODBUS over Serial Line systems, attacks will
generally originate from the computer which hosts
the HMI or from an infected PLC. For
MODBUS/TCP systems, the primary target would
be any computer reach the master and slave devices
via network communication. TCP networks often
include firewalls which use access control lists to

limit traffic on a network. In this case, an attack can
only be launched from computers with permission to
communicate with the MODBUS master, slave or
other device in the feedback loop (such as a
historian). Many industrial control systems
implement communication links using wireless
technologies. These wireless technologies, whether
proprietary or standardized, are vulnerable to attack
(Reaves & Morris, 2012). Computers which
penetrate wireless links can launch attacks against
both MODBUS over Serial Line and
MODBUS/TCP systems.

Table 2 Command Injection and Denial of Service Attacks versus IDS Rule Cross Reference

Name

Associated Intrusion Detection Rule

Altered System Control Scheme

4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State

Altered Actuator State

4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State

Continually Altered Actuator State

4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State

Altered PID Parameter(s)

3.8 Invalid PID Parameter
4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State

Altered Control Set Point

3.9 Pipeline Invalid Set Point
3.10 Storage Tank Invalid Set Point
4.10 Pipeline High Pressure Critical State
4.11 Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State
4.12 Storage Tank High Liquid Level Critical State
4.13 Storage Tank Low Liquid Level Critical State

Force Listen Only Mode

3.11 Force Listen Only Mode

Restart Communication

3.12 Restart Communication

Clear Data Log

3.13 Clear Communications Event Log

Change ASCII Input Delimiter

3.14 Change ASCII Input Delimiter

Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC)

4.14 Invalid CRC Count

MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming

4.15 MODBUS Flood
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output registers which store process parameters;
pump state, water level, and alarm state.

3.1 Gas Pipeline and Storage Tank Test Bed
The attacks and rules presented in this paper were
developed and tested in laboratory environment
(Morris, et al., 2011). Testing was performed on two
laboratory scale control systems; a water storage
tank and a gas pipeline system. The water storage
tank models an oil storage tank control system used
to monitor oil inventory and distribute oil to refinery
processes. The pipeline control system models a
pipeline used to move natural gas or other petroleum
products to market. Both control systems include a
master terminal unit (MTU) and remote terminal
unit (RTU) connected with a MODBUS/RTU
network. Operators can remotely monitor and
control both systems using the HMI. The HMI polls
the RTU for system state periodically.

To perform the attacks described in this paper a
serial bump in the wire was used. This bump in the
wire continuously logs all MODBUS over Serial
Line traffic. The bump in the wire also includes
hooks to alter, delay, or drop packets. The bump in
the wire also includes hooks to inject traffic in either
direction on the serial link.
3.2 Reconnaissance Class Attacks
Four reconnaissance attacks were implemented for
this work. First, the address scan attack sends
MODBUS queries to all legal MODBUS addresses
listening for responses. Implemented MODBUS
addresses will respond with an error message or a
message indicating success. Non-implemented
addresses will lead to no response. The attack
implemented for this paper walks through each legal
address (0…247) to build a list of implemented
addresses. The function code scan attack is similar
to the address scan except that it walks through all
legal MODBUS function code scans to builds a list
of implemented function codes by connected
address. As with the address scan attack, the function
code attack detects implemented function codes
based upon device response. Invalid function codes
provide a specific invalid function code exception.
The device identification attack uses two read device
identification functions built-in to the MODBUS
protocol to learn PLC run status, vendor name, the
product code, and the major, minor revision, vendor
uniform resource locator (URL), the product name,
the model name, the user application name, and
other device specific information. This information
can be used to search for known vulnerabilities in
published vulnerability databases. The point scan
attack creates a map of implemented MODBUS data
block addresses (coils, discrete inputs, holding
registers, and input registers) for an identified
MODBUS device address. Point scan attacks
attempt to read from and write to each legal data
block address and use MODBUS response codes to
determine which addresses are implemented and
which are not. The last reconnaissance attack is the
memory dump attack. The memory dump attack
attempts to read the contents of all PLC data blocks.

The storage tank control system includes a pump to
fill the storage tank, a gravity fed manual relieve
valve which allows water to drain from the tank, and
a sensor which provides the water level in the
primary tank as a percentage of total capacity. The
storage tank is an on/off control system which turns
the pump on and off to keep the water level between
high (H) and low (L) set points.
The pipeline control system contains a closed loop
gas pipeline connected to an air pump which pumps
air into the pipeline. A solenoid controlled release
valve can be opened to release air pressure from the
pipeline. A pressure sensor is attached to the pipeline
which allows pressure visibility at the pipeline and
remotely on an HMI screen. The pipeline uses a
proportional integral derivative control scheme to
control the pump or solenoid relief valve based upon
system configuration.
Ladder logic is used to program the RTU connected
to the meters and actuators of both systems. Both
systems include registers to store set points which
are adjusted via the human machine interface (HMI)
software connected to the master node. Pipeline set
points include system mode (manual, automatic, or
off), manual pump override (on, off), manual relief
valve override (open or closed), target pressure, and
PID configuration set points. The gas pipeline
includes pump state, relief valve state, and pressure
measurement output registers. The storage tank RTU
ladder logic includes H and L level, HH and LL
alarm level, system mode (manual, automatic, or
off), and manual pump override (on, off) set points.
The storage tank RTU ladder logic also includes 3
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or injected MODBUS packet whose payload length
does not match the quantity of objects requested by
the previous MODBUS query. The Naïve False
Error Response Attack injects false error responses
for valid queries by setting the response function
code to the query function code plus 0x80 and
providing a valid or invalid MODBUS exception
code. The Negative Sensor Measurement Attack is
an altered or injected MODBUS response packet
which includes negative values for measurements
which do not typically report negative values. For
example, pipeline pressure and water tank percent
full should both be positive and a negative value for
either measurement would be obviously incorrect.
The Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-Of-Bounds
Attack injects process measurements significantly
outside the bounds of alarm set points. Figure 3 is an
example of a Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-OfBounds Attack. The measurements labeled NMRI
are far out of bounds and easy to detect.

3.3 Response Injection Class Attacks
Response injection attacks affect network traffic
from MODBUS server to client (responses to
MODBUS queries). Response injection attacks take
3 forms. First, response injection attacks can
originate from malicious control of a programmable
logic controller or remote terminal unit. Second,
response injection attacks can capture network
packets and alter contents during transmission from
server to client. Finally, response injection attacks
may be crafted and injected into the network by a
third party device.
Naïve malicious response injection (NMRI) attacks
lack knowledge of the physical system or its control
logic. A Naïve Read Payload Attack has a payload
made up of random contents, all zeroes, or all ones.
This attack is called naïve because no knowledge of
the physical system or its control logic is required.
The Invalid Read Payload Size Attack is an altered

Figure 3 Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-of-Bounds Attack

The Sporadic Sensor Measurement Injection Attack
injects false process measurements outside the
bounds of H and L control set points while not
outside the alarm set point range formed by HH and
LL. The Random Sensor Measurement Injection

Attack injects random process measurements for the
pipeline pressure and water tank water level. Since
these measurement values are random some falsified
measurements are within process limits (LL/HH and
L/H limits) and some are not.
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Figure 4 CMRI High Slope Measurement Injection Attack

Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI)
attacks appear similar to normal system behavior
through knowledge of the system being attacked.
The Constant Sensor Measurement Injection Attack
injects malicious packets containing the same
measurement over a period of time in order to mask
the real state of the system. The Calculated Sensor
Measurement Injection Attack injects process
measurements using some model of the physical
process which is used to predict behavior. The
Replayed Measurement Injection Attack injects
previously collected measurements captured from
eavesdropping on system communications. The
replayed measurement and calculated sensor
measurement injection attacks are quite similar to
one another except for their source of measurement
values to inject. The High Frequency Measurement
Injection Attack injects measurements in a normal
range which changes at a faster rate than the normal
system behavior. The Low Frequency Measurement
Injection Attack injects measurements in a normal
range which changes at a lower rate than the normal
system behavior. Figure 4 is an example of a High
Frequency Measurement Injection Attack against a
storage tank.

remote field devices. Many control systems include
automatic and manual modes. The Altered System
Mode Attack injects a command to switch between
manual and automatic mode. The Altered Actuator
State Attack changes a system actuator state. For
example, a pump may be turned on or off or a switch
opened or closed. The Continually Altered Actuator
State Attack repeatedly alters the state of an actuator
in a system. This may be done to attempt to cause
physical damage to a system component.
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI)
attacks change parameters used by control schemes
on a device to cause incorrect system behavior. The
Altered Proportional Integral Derivative (PID)
Parameter Attack changes PID control parameters.
Changing PID parameters can cause the controller to
perform incorrect control actions. The Altered
Control Set Point Attack changes device set points.
Set points are typically used to provide variable
control over a system. For example the storage tank
system uses an ON/OFF control scheme to keep the
amount of liquid in a tank between a low set point
and a high set point.
Malicious Function Code Injection (MFCI) attacks
use function codes which specify functions which
can be used to cause denial of service attacks or to
erase evidence of other attacks. The Force Listen
Only Mode Attack injects a command which causes
a MODBUS server (a PLC) to no longer transmit on
the network. This denial of service will lead to loss
of the ability to remotely monitor and control a
system. The Restart Communication Attack injects a

3.4 Command Injection Attacks
Command injection attacks inject false control and
configuration commands into a control system.
Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI) attacks
change the state of the process control system
abnormally to drive the system from a safe state to a
critical state by sending malicious commands to
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command which causes the MODBUS server to
restart which leads to a temporary loss of
communication. This loss of communication leads to
a temporary inability to observe and control the
process. The Clear Communications Event Log
Attack
clears
the
MODBUS
server’s
communications event log. This attack may be used
to erase evidence of a prior attack. The Change
ASCII Input Delimiter Attack changes the frame
delimiter used for MODBUS ASCII devices to
identify the start and end of a network frame. Such a
change would cause a denial of service.

this section require large volumes of traffic to
initiate.
The Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) attack
injects large volumes of MODBUS packets with
incorrect CRC. Packets with invalid CRC are
rejected by both MODBUS servers and clients. The
victim device must check the CRC of each packet. A
flood of packets with invalid CRC can overwhelm a
device causing slow system responses or no system
responses due to a crashed network stack.
The MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming Attack 18 is
specific to a proprietary wireless communication
system. The proprietary wireless radio includes a
carrier sense back off arbitration scheme which
causes legitimate slaves to wait for a clear line to
transmit. In laboratory experiments, attackers were
able to force a legitimate slave to stay idle ad
infinitum by continuously transmitting from a 3rd
radio connected to the network. Figure 5 shows the
impact of the MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming
Attack against a storage tank from the perspective of
the HMI. When the attack starts the HMI no longer
receives responses to its water level queries and
therefore the water level in the plot no longer
changes.

3.5 Denial of Service Attacks
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks attempt to break
communication links to prevent remote monitoring
or control of a system. This section documents two
DOS attacks which require large volumes of injected
packets. The Force Listen Only Mode, Restart
Communication, and Change ASCII Input Delimiter
attacks are also denial of service attacks. These three
were listed in the command injection attack section
because they require an injected MODBUS
command to initiate, whereas, the DOS attacks in

Figure 5 MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming Attack Effect

described in the section are designed to detect the
attacks described previously. The rules are divided
into two types; standalone and state-based rules. The
set of rules developed for this work are listed in
Table 3 and Table 4. Standalone rules parse a single
MODBUS packet looking for a match to a specific

4. SIGNATURE BASED INTRUSION
DETECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL
CONTROL SYSTEMS
This section provides a set of rules for a signature
based intrusion detection system. The rules

46

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1)
signature. If the signature is present in the parsed
packet then the packet is classified as a match and an
alert is issued. The standalone rules are implemented
using the Snort intrusion detection tool. The second
type of rule is called state based. State based rules
require knowledge from previous MODBUS packets
or from another source, such as a process sensor.
This extra knowledge may be related to the protocol
state or the state of the industrial control system
being monitored. State based rules are processed
using a Snort pre-processor, hence forth referred to
as the state based layer. Snort passes the MODBUS
payload in its entirety to the state based layer. The
state based layer is written in the C programming
language. A set of C-language structures were
developed to store the state of the MODBUS
protocol and a historical model of the state of the
industrial control system. The model of the state of
the industrial control system is system specific and
requires expert knowledge to develop. The protocol
state structure stores the last received MODBUS
packet. The historical state for the industrial control
system holds the command state and the process

state. The command state is updated each time a
command is sent to a MODBUS server. For the
pipeline, the command state includes items such as
the on/off state of the pump, the open/closed state of
the relief valve, the system mode (manual or
automatic), copies of set points, and other process
specific control information. The process state
includes measurements related to the process. For
the pipeline, the process state includes the last
pressure reading and other system measurements.
Figure 6 shows the intrusion detection system
architecture with separate standalone and state based
layers. For this work, a tap cable was added which
allowed monitoring of all MODBUS over Serial line
traffic. The tap cable includes only a receive pin and
therefore cannot transmit. The tap cable monitored
traffic between the MODBUS master PLC and slave
PLC (aka RTU). A gasket which converts MODBUS
over Serial Line traffic to MODBUS/TCP traffic
was used to feed traffic to Snort for monitoring. For
MODBUS/TCP systems a port mirror can be used to
capture traffic on the network.

State Based
traffic

alerts

Stand Alone
Snort

alerts

Alert
Log

tap

Master
PLC/HMI

MODBUS Traffic

PLC/RTU
Node

Figure 6 Intrusion Detection System Architecture

layers. MODBUS/TCP address scans search for IP
addresses with MODBUS servers. MODBUS RTU
and ASCII use a 1 byte address field. MODBUS
RTU and ASCII address scans search for address
values which provoke a response. MODBUS
systems typically have a static set of member nodes
each with a fixed address. A white list of system
address, whether IP addresses or 1 byte addresses for
MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems, can be
developed. Rules 3.1 and 3.2 are used to detect

4.1 Snort Rule Descriptions
In this section and in Table 1 and Table 2 signature
based IDS rules are referred to using the notation
table number dot rule number (t.r). For example
Rule 3.1 is the first rule in Table 3 and Rule 4.2 is
the second rule in Table 4.
Table 3 lists the standalone rules. Rules 3.1-3.7 are
used to detect reconnaissance attacks. MODBUS
address scans differ based upon the upper network
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packets which are addressed to a system not in
address white lists.

start address. The length value is available for all
write and read function codes. Rules 3.5 and 3.6 are
implemented as separate rules for each write and
read function code. They are described here as two
rules for simplicity. Rule 3.7 is also used to detect
point scans. Rule 3.7 alerts if an invalid address
exception code is detected for a read or write
function code. Properly functioning MODBUS
clients should not attempt to access an address which
is not configured for reading on the target MODBUS
server. As such any instance of the invalid address
exception code is evidence of a points scan. Rule 3.7
is not adequate to detect all point scans as it is
possible certain memory regions are available on a
MODBUS server by default while not actually in use
for the specific control system being protected. The
white lists associated with Rules 3.5 and 3.6 should
only include address regions needed for the specific
control system being protected. Rule 3.6 is also used
to detect memory dump attacks. The read address
white list should only include read addresses
reserved for access through the network and should
not include addresses used for internal program
variables.

A system specific white list can be developed which
includes all legal function codes a MODBUS server
supports. The function code white list can include all
public MODBUS function codes and any user
defined function codes. However, many systems use
only a subset of the public MODBUS function
codes. As such the function code white list should be
limited to function codes used by the system being
protected. Rule 3.3 alerts if a packet is received
which includes a function code not in the function
code white list.
Device ID scans are detected with Rule 3.4 which
alerts if the function code is 0x11 or 0x2B. Since the
allowed function code white list will not include
function codes 0x11 and 0x2B Rule 3.3 will also
alert for Device ID attacks. Care should be taken
when implementing the device ID scan rule since it
effectively bars operators from reading device IDs.
If reading the device ID is required the device ID
scan rule should be updated accordingly.
Point scans are detected using 3 rules. First, Rules
3.5 and 3.6 use address white lists to detect read and
write transaction addresses for non-existing or black
listed memory regions. There is a write-able regions
white list and a read-able regions white list. These
white lists include a list of contiguous address
regions which allow memory writes and reads
respectively. Rules 3.5 and 3.6 rules confirm the
start address is within the white listed address
region. Rules 3.5 and 3.6 also compute the end
address and confirm the end address is within the
white listed address region. The end address is
computed by adding the read or write length to the

Rule 3.8 alerts when a command to set PID
parameters to an invalid value is detected. The
pipeline system uses a PID controller to open and
close the relief valve to keep the pressure within the
high (H) and low (L) set points. Small changes in
PID parameters can lead to drastic changes in system
behavior. As such, Rule 3.8 alerts for any change in
any of the five PID parameters; gain, rate, reset, dead
band, and cycle time. In systems where PID values
are regularly changed, this type of rule can include
valid ranges for PID values.
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Table 3 MODBUS Standalone Intrusion Detection Rules

Number

Name

Description

1

RTU/ASCII Invalid Address

packet address address white list

2

TCP Invalid Address

IP address IP address white list

3

Function Code Scan

packet function code  function code white list

4

Device ID Scan

function code  {0x11, 0x2B}

5

Write Points Scan

(start address && end address) write address region
white list

6

Read Points Scan

(start address && end address) read address region
white list

7

Invalid Address

Response & function code {0x81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86,
8F, 90, 95, 96, A2, A3, A4} & exception code = 02

8

Invalid PID Parameter

gain != 115 | rate != 0 | reset != 0.2 | deadband != 0.5 |
cycle time != 1.0

9

Pipeline Invalid Set Point

P > 30 | L < 5

10

Storage Tank Invalid Set Point

H > 80 | L < 20 | HH > 90 | LL < 10

11

Force Listen Only Mode

function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0004

12

Restart Communication

function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0001

13

Clear Communications Event
Log

function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0001&
data = 0xFF00

14

Change ASCII Input Delimiter

function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0003

15

Illegal Packet Length

Packet length > 255

16

Invalid Response Payload
Content

Response & function code is 0x80 & each byte in
payload is 0x00 or 0Xff

17

Invalid Response Payload Size

Response & function code is 0x80 & payload size !=
request payload size in the command

18

Invalid Error Response

Function code is 0x80 & exception code !{0x1, 2, 3, 4}
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Table 4 MODBUS State Based Intrusion Detection Rules

Number

Name

Description

1

Pipeline Pressure Negative Response

Response & function code = 03& point
address = 04 & value <0

2

Storage Tank Fill Level Negative
Response

Response & function code = 03 & point
address = 07 & value <0

3

Pipeline Measurement Out-of-bounds

Response & function code = 03& point
address = b7 & (value < LL OR value > HH)

4

Storage Tank Measurement Out-ofbounds

Response & function code = 03 & point
address = e9 & (value < LL OR value > HH)

5

Pipeline Measurement Max Rate of
Change

Response & function code = 03 & point
address = b7 & slope > SLmax & slope != 0

6

Storage Tank Measurement Max Rate
of Change

Response & function code = 03& point
address = e9 & (M1-M0/T1-T0) > SLmax &
slope != 0

7

Pipeline Measurement Min Rate of
Change

Response & function code = 03 & point
address = b7 & slope < SLmin & slope != 0

8

Storage Tank Measurement Min Rate
of Change

Response & function code = 03& point
address = e9& slope < SLmin & slope != 0

9

Pipeline Constant Measurement

Response & function code = 03& point
address = b7& NC > T & SystemMode =
AUTO

10

Pipeline High Pressure Critical State

pressure > HH & pump = ON &
relief valve = CLOSED

11

Pipeline Low Pressure Critical State

pressure < LL & (pump = OFF |
relief valve = OPEN)

12

Storage Tank High Liquid Level
Critical State

liquid level > HH & pump = ON

13

Storage Tank Low Liquid Level
Critical State

liquid level < LL & pump = OFF & system =
ON

14

Invalid CRC Count

invalid CRC count > 5 in time window 5

15

MODBUS Flood

MODBUS Packet Count > 5 in time window
5

Rules 4.1 and 4.2 alert when sensor measurements
are negative. These rules are system specific. Rule
4.1 alerts for a negative pressure measurement for a
pipeline system. Rule 4.2 alerts for a negative water
level measurement for a storage system. In each
case, the rule must be programmed with the function
code used to read the measurement, the exact
address of the point which stores the measurement
the measurement, and the width of the measurement
in bytes. There may be more than one function code

used to poll the MODBUS server for a measurement.
In this case, multiple instances of the rule can be
created to cover each case. Also, often MODBUS
clients will read many points in a single read. In this
case, Rules 4.1 and 4.2 should be updated to check
the correct set of bytes within the larger read
payload. These rules are state-based because
MODBUS read responses do not include the address
which was read from. As such, the state based layer
stores the read command details, including the read
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start address and quantity, and uses this information
within the rule.

slope 

M1  M 0
T1 T0

Rules 4.3 and 4.4 alert when process measurements
are grossly out of bounds. These rules are system
specific. Rule 4.3 alerts for an out-of-bounds
pressure measurement for a pipeline system. Rule
4.4 alerts for an out-of-bounds water level
measurement for a storage system. Both rules are
programmed with extreme limits for their respective
process. These rules may be configured as rules if
the extreme limits for the process are static or are
changed infrequently. The extreme limits should be
set relative to the alarm thresholds for the process
measurement.

(1)

Rules 4.7 and 4.8 alert for low rates of change. These
rules detect low slope measurement injection
attacks. Similar to the maximum rate of change, the
minimum rate of change is system specific and
system experts should be consulted when setting this
limit. In many systems, acceptable minimum rate of
change cannot be defined. In such cases, no
minimum rate of change rule should be applied. Also
many systems have a minimum rate of change with
the exception that no change is an allowed condition.
For this work, Rules 4.7 and 4.8 do not alert if the
calculated slope is 0.

Rules 4.5-4.8 alert if the rate of change of a sensor
measurement exceeds or falls below specific
maximum and minimums respectively. Rules 4.5
and 4.6 alert for high rates of change. A high rate of
change may be a symptom of a high slope attack or
sporadic or random measurement injection attacks.
As successive measurements are observed in
network traffic, the most recent measurement value
and the timestamp of the latest measurement are
stored in the state based layer. As new measurements
are observed, the rate of change of process
measurements is calculated and compared with a
predefined maximum rate of change value. The rate
of change is calculated using equation 1, where M0
is the current measurement, M1 the previous
measurement, T1 is the time stamp of the current
measurement, and T0 is the timestamp of the
previous measurement. Control systems tend to poll
sensor measurements periodically meaning T1-T0
will be approximately constant. For Rules 4.5 and
4.6, the term SLmax, in Table 4, is the maximum rate
of change allowed. In some systems, separate
maximum rates of change will be defined for the
rising and falling measurement case. In such cases,
two rules will be needed for each system. The
maximum rate of change is system specific and must
be defined in consultation with a system expert. This
rule will not detect all sporadic and random sensor
measurement injections since some injected
measurements may be close enough to the previous
value to not trigger the alert. However, during an
extended attack many measurements will trigger an
alert.

Rule 4.9 alerts when a threshold of T consecutive
packets is observed with the same process
measurement. In the description of Rule 4.9, from
Table 4, the variable NC is the count of consecutive
packets without a measurement change. The state
based layer calculates the count of consecutive
packets without a process measurement change. The
state based layer also stores the current process
system mode (AUTO or MANUAL). Rule 4.9 only
detects constant level injection attacks in system
state in which the process measurement is known to
change. For systems where the measurement may
legally be constant, these rules are not applicable. A
constant level injection attack may also be detected
by the rate of change rules (Rules 4.6 and 4.7) if the
injected measurement varies significantly from the
measurement observed immediately before the
attack initiates. Subsequent packets during the attack
will not trigger alerts from the rate of change rules.
Rules 4.10-4.13 monitor the physical process state
and alert when the process is in a critical state. For
this paper, a critical state is defined as a state of
alarm in which the control settings will drive the
system further away from a normal system state.
Rule 4.10 alarms if the pipeline pressure is above the
high level alarm set point (HH) and the pump is on
and the relief valve is closed. Rule 4.11 alarms if the
pipeline pressure is below the low level alarm set
point (LL) and the pump is off or the relief valve is
open. Rule 4.12 alarms if the storage tank liquid
level is above the alarm set point (HH) and the pump
is on. Rule 4.13 alarms if the storage tank liquid level
is below the alarm set point (LL) and the pump is off
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and the system is on. Each of these states should
never occur. These IDS rules may alert due to an
actual process fault which leads the system to a
critical state or may occur due to a cyber-attack
driving the process to a critical state via command
injection attack. These state based rules will alert for
some but not all cases of the altered system control
scheme, altered actuator state, continually altered
actuator state, altered proportional integral
derivative parameter(s), and altered control set point
command injection attacks. The rules will only alert
if the command injection drives the process to a
critical state.

to generate the MODBUS-RTU and MODBUS
ASCII CRC and LRC respectively are available in
the MODBUS over Serial Line Specification and
Implementation Guide 9. Each packet is monitored
in the state based layer. The CRC/LRC is calculated
within the state based layer and compared to the
CRC/LRC with the packet. A count of failed
CRC/LRC over a time window is kept. If the number
of failed CRC/LRC exceeds a programmable
threshold an alert is issued. For this work, the time
window was 1 seconds and the number of failed
CRC required to trigger the rules was 2.
The MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming Attack is
detected with Rule 4.15. If the count of MODBUS
packets in a given time window exceeds a threshold
a flood alert is produced.

Rule 4.14 detects the invalid cyclic redundancy code
(CRC) flood attack. MODBUS-RTU mode uses a
16-bit CRC and MODBUS-ASCII uses an 8-bit
longitudinal redundancy code (LRC). The functions

Table 5 Signature based IDS Detection Results by Class

Pipeline System

Storage System

Detection
Rate

False
Positive

Detection
Rate

False
Positive

Reconnaissance

98.7%

0.0%

98.7%

0.0%

NMRI

95.4%

0.8%

94.2%

0.8%

CMRI

92.5%

0.5%

93.7%

0.6%

MSCI

89.8%

0.7%

90.1%

0.7%

MPCI

93.1%

0.0%

93.0%

0.0%

MFCI

100%

0.0%

100%

0.0%

DOS

100%

0.0%

100%

0.0%

Normal

99.5%

-

99.5%

-

memory addresses. These ranges contain valid
device addresses, function codes and memory
addresses which have been defined in white lists.
The rules miss these malicious packets and do not
trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the
reconnaissance attacks was 0% for the pipeline
control system and 0% for the storage tank control
system. This means the signature based IDS does not
misclassify the normal traffic or other types of attack
as reconnaissance attacks.

4.2 Snort Rule Validation
Table 5 lists signature detection rate and false
positive percentage for signature evaluation using
the pipeline and storage systems. The results in
Table 5 are presented by attack class.
The detection rate for reconnaissance attacks was
98.7% for the pipeline system and 98.7% for the
storage tank system. A review of the misclassified
attacks showed that the signature based IDS failed to
detect the malicious packets that contain valid
device ID, function codes, and read/write memory
addresses. During a reconnaissance attack, attackers
scan ranges of device addresses, function codes and

The detection rate for NMRI attacks was 95.4% for
the pipeline system and 94.2% for the storage tank
system. A review of the misclassified attack cases
showed that the signature based IDS failed to detect
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malicious packets that contain gas pressure
measurements or water level measurements out of
the bounds defined by the IDS rules. During the
NMRI attack, when the malicious packet contains a
false measurement that is very close (in time) to
valid or true measurement, the malicious packet will
not violate the IDS rules. The false positive rate for
the NMRI attacks was 0.8% for the pipeline control
system and 0.8% for the storage tank control system.
A review of the false positive cases showed that the
IDS misclassified some normal traffic packets as
NMRI packets. Sometimes valid measurements fall
outside the bounds set by Rules 4.3 and 4.4. These
situations will trigger a false alarm. The same
occurrence will trigger an alarm. Both the rules and
alarm levels should be updated to better reflect
system behavior.

showed that the IDS failed to detect some packets
that contain malicious system state commands. The
Snort rules defined ranges of the system parameters.
When these crafted parameters were in the allowed
range, the malicious packets were not detected. The
false positive rate for the MSCI attacks was 0.7% for
the pipeline system and 0.7% for the storage tank
system. The false positive cases occur when alarm
levels are set too close to the normal operating range
of the system. These levels can be adjusted to
minimize false positives.
The detection rate for MPCI attacks was 93.1% for
the pipeline control system and 93.0% for the
storage tank control system. A review of the
misclassified cases showed that the IDS failed to
detect some MPCI packets that contained set point
values that do not violate Rules 4.9-4.10. During an
MPCI attack, when a malicious packet contains set
point values within allowed ranges defined by Rules
4.9-4.10 alerts are not triggered. The false positive
rate for the MPCI attacks was 0% for the pipeline
control system and 0% for the storage tank control
system.

The detection rate for CMRI attacks was 92.5% for
the pipeline control system and 93.7% for the
storage tank control system. A review of the
misclassified attack case showed two issues. CMRI
attack detection heavily relies on the min max rate
of process measurement change rules. It is hoped
that the transition from normal unaltered
measurements to altered measurements has a slope
which violates state based Rules 4.6-4.9 thresholds.
If an attack lasts multiple packets and within the
attack measurements do not violate the state based
Rules 4.6-4.9 thresholds those packets will be
misclassified. The first packet of the attack may be
detected but some packets within the attack may not
be detected. Second, if the state based Rules 4.6-4.9
thresholds are not violated at all during the attack
then the attack can go unnoticed. This is especially
possible during the calculated and replay CMRI
attacks. The false positive rate for the CMRI attacks
was 0.5% for the pipeline system and 0.7% for the
storage tank system. A review of false positive cases
showed that the IDS misclassified some normal
traffic as CMRI packets. The timestamp applied to
packets is not added by the RTU PLC. The
timestamp is added by a separate data logger
process. The timestamp is sometimes incorrect due
to the data logger computer becoming busy with
other processes. This leads to incorrect rate of
change values which trigger the minimum rate of
change rules.

The detection rate for MFCI attacks was 100% for
the pipeline control system and 100 % for the storage
tank control system. The false positive rate for the
MFCI attacks was 0% for the pipeline control system
and 0% for the storage tank control system. MFCI
attacks require use of specific banned function and
sub function codes and are therefore easily detected.
The detection rate for DOS attacks was 100% for the
pipeline control system and 100% for the storage
tank control system. The false positive rate for the
DOS attacks was 0% for the pipeline control system
and 0% for the storage tank control system. High
volumes of packets are easy to detect.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Industrial control systems are vulnerable to multiple
types of network based attacks including
reconnaissance, response injection, command
injection, and denial of service attacks. This paper
presents 28 network based attacks which target
MODBUS systems. The attacks were implemented
and tested against two control systems; a pipeline
and storage tank system. The existence of such
attacks drives the need for digital forensic systems
which can capture and store evidence of attacks for
intrusion detection and post incident forensic

The detection rate for MSCI attacks was 89.8% for
the pipeline system and 90.1% for the storage tank
system. A review of the misclassified attack cases

53

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1)
4. Falliere, N., O’Murchu, L., & Chien, E. (2001).
W32. Stuxnet Dossier, Symantec Tech. Rep.
1.4. Retrieved on April 30, 2014 from
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterp
rise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32
_stuxnet_dossier.pdf.
5. Fleury, T., Khurana, H., & Welch, V. (2009).
Towards a taxonomy of attacks against energy
control systems, in Critical Infrastructure
Protection II, eds. M. Papa and S. Shenoi.
Springer.
6. Huang, Y. Cardenas, A., Amin, S., Lin, Z., Tsai,
H., & Sastry, S. (2009). Understanding the
physical and economic consequences of attacks
on control systems. International Journal of
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2(3), 73-83.
7. Huitsing. P., Chandia, R., Papa, M., & Shenoi,
S., (2008). Attack taxonomies for the Modbus
protocols. International Journal of Critical
Infrastructure Protection, 1, 37-44.
8. Liu, Y., Reiter, M., & Ning, P. (2009). False data
injection attacks against state estimation in
electric power grids. 16th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security,
November 9-13, 2009, Chicago, IL, USA.
9. Mallouhi, M., Al-Nashif, Y., Cox, D., Chadaga,
T., & Hariri, S. (2011). A testbed for analyzing
security of SCADA Control Systems
(TASSCS). 2011 IEEE PES Innovative Smart
Grid Technologies (ISGT), January 17-19,
2011, Anaheim, CA, USA.
10. MODBUS-IDA. (2006). MODBUS Application
Protocol Specification V1.1b. Retrieved on
April 30, 2014 from
11. www.modbus.org/docs/Modbus_Application_P
rotocol_V1_1b.pdf.
12. Morris, T. & Pavurapu, K. (2010). A retrofit
network transaction data logger and intrusion
detection system for transmission and
distribution substations. IEEE International
Conference on Power and Energy (PECon).
December 2-5, 2012, Sutera Harbour, Sabah,
Malaysia.
13. Morris, T., Srivastava, A., Reaves, B., Gao, W.,
Pavurapu, K., & Reddi, R. (2011). A control
system testbed to validate critical infrastructure
protection concepts. International Journal of
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 4(2), 88-103.
14. Morris, T., Vaughn, R., & Dandass, Y. (2012).
A retrofit network intrusion detection system for
MODBUS RTU and ASCII industrial control

analysis. This paper presents 18 standalone and 15
state based IDS rules to detect the cyber attacks
presented. Standalone rules monitor the contents of
a single network frame to detect an attack. State
based rules monitor multiple network packets to
build up model of the present state of the
communication protocol or the control system itself.
Together standalone and state based rules provide a
highly effective means to detect cyber attacks
against control systems with low false positive rates.
A great deal of industrial control system research
centers around anomaly based and specification
based IDS research. Signature based IDS are
generally known quantities by the IDS research
community and therefore may not be considered for
use in industrial control systems. However,
industrial
control
systems
have
regular
communication patterns and predictable system state
and control schemes. This regularity and
predictability make them prime candidates for
signature based IDS. Implementing the rules
described in this paper, or similar rules for different
types of control systems, can lead to a more secure
critical infrastructure. Signature based IDS rules can
be added as events occur and can be shared within
industry and government to provide a level of
protection that currently does not exist. Also,
signature based IDS rules are easily adjustable and
therefore can be customized for the specific system
which they protect. Many control systems are
designed and maintained by 3rd party system
integrators. System integrators should be trained in
the use of signature based IDS to provide a first line
of protection for control systems.
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